When towards the end of the 1950s Lawrence Kohlberg began his research in the
field of moral development, which was to span nearly 30 years, he
wholeheartedly subscribed to Jean Piaget's cognitive developmental theory,
which had been developed over the preceding 30 years. Despite recurrent
criticism, the latter's work has never lost its appeal to psychologists nor has
it ceased to influence their own research. With Piaget's theory being based on
the assumption that development is a construction process in which children
build ever more complex cognitive structures through their reciprocal
interaction with the environment (in Crain, 1992: 103), Kohlberg approached his
subject accordingly. Likewise believing that cognitive development takes place
in a sequence of stages which mirror children's mental abilities at a
particular level, he set out to "describe age-related transformations in
the organization of moral thought" (Turiel, 1983: 130). Kohlberg reasoned
that these would presuppose advances in the realms of "logical and social
thought" (Crain, 1992: 149), and that upon realization of the inferiority
of a stage, this would be integrated into a higher, cognitively and morally
more adequate stage. Unlike Piaget, however, who claimed that children did not
differentiate between moral and social issues and accordingly confronted them
with a variety of tasks pertaining to both domains, Kohlberg focused on purely
moral concepts. For him that meant assessing a person's ability to give a
detailed account of the reasons for judging right or wrong decisions involving
justice, fairness and welfare. And like his predecessor's, his influence in
this domain has been a lasting one.
In order to evaluate their moral reasoning, Kohlberg confronted children,
adolescents and young adults with hypothetical events involving moral dilemmas.
The subjects' responses to conflicting claims were elicited by way of clinical
interviews, which leave researchers scope for tailoring each interview to the
individual situation. With the help of a scoring manual accounting for all the
different responses, their findings were then assessed. Based on the careful
analysis of a substantial amount of empirical data in the form of detailed
examples of reasoning, Kohlberg formulated a culturally universal, invariant
sequence of six stages outlining the origins of moral judgment. (in Turiel,
1993: 153-154 and 3)
He established three levels accomodating the six stages, each level being
characterized by a certain kind of morality which differs only slightly between
the two relevant stages, but widely across the levels. At the first level, the
Preconventional Level, subjectivism reigns among the 4 to 10-year olds. Right
is what the subject likes, and at Stage 1 s/he likes what brings rewards or
avoids punishment (as a sign of 'wrongness'). Accordingly, rules that are seen
as externally imposed and unchangeable are strictly observed (by an individual
not yet belonging to society, hence 'pre-conventional'). According to Kohlberg,
this punishment orientation is caused by the unequal power structure between
adults, the main socializing agents at that age. At Stage 2, however,
punishment is simply seen as a risk best avoided. Beginning to question the
existence of one 'collective' authority, the child also recognizes and
acknowledges self-interest in other individuals, too. This level, although not
quite mapping onto Piaget's age-classification, can be seen as corresponding to
his level of Preoperational Thought (2-7 years). This is characterized by
egocentrism, since children are not yet able to consider other people's
perspectives.
Overcoming this limitation enables them to enter Piaget's stage of Concrete
Operations (7-11/12) with its increasing awareness of viewpoints other than
their own. Transferred to Kohlberg, this entails their attainment of Level 2,
the Conventional Level, covering ages 10-13. Arguing like Piaget, Kohlberg
attributes this advance to increasing peer interaction with its more balanced
power structure, the frequent exposure to conflict, and the need to make
oneself understood without the help of adult prompting or guessing. The
solipsistic subjectivity of Level 1 has now turned into collective subjectivity
with self-interest being replaced by group interest. Accordingly, conformity
reigns. In Stage 3 this means living up to the expectations of others close to
oneself in order to meet their approval, whereas in Stage 4, rightness is
equated with conformity to the demands of some higher authority, i.e. the
society as a whole or the state.
Outgrowing this law-and-order morality adopted to preserve the society of which
they are members (hence 'conventional'), leads to a state of transcendent
objectivity, in which adolescents and adults contemplate the values an ideal
society should be based on irrespective of individual or collective interests.
Attaining Piaget's stage of Formal Operational Thinking (beginning at the age
of 11/12), which means that their thinking will be highly abstract and
hypothetical, allows adolescents and adults to reason at the Postconventional
Level 3, i.e. not referring to the society of their reality. Contemplating what
the future will hold for them in the society they are about to enter, Stage 5
thinkers value those decisions that are based on humanistic and democratic principles.
However, even these do not guarantee freedom from injustice, for example, so
Stage 6 respondents try to formulate truly universal values, such as justice,
that would require a decision to be based on equal respect for all in order to
be deemed morally right. (Based on Stigler, 1992: 133-136 and Crain, 1990:
136-141 and 115-121)
Given the high level of abstraction and idealization required by
post-conventional thinking, it is hardly surprising that Kohlberg's interviews
hardly revealed any Stage 5 reasoning, let alone the principled morality of
Stage 6, among his subjects. Maintaining - as he does - that children under
four do not possess any moral reasoning abilities at all, is something
altogether different, however. After all, extensive research has in the
meantime produced sufficient evidence to suggest that moral judgment can indeed
be found in children well before they attain formal reasoning capacities. The
late onset of moral reasoning according to Kohlberg, on the other hand, can
wholly be attributed to the difficulties of testing younger children on the
basis of the methods he applied. In view of some more general methodological
problems inherent in Kohlberg's research, it may be useful to evaluate the
reliability of his findings at a very basic level, before dealing with some
major points of contention raised against his overall theory.
Focusing on the way his dilemmas and questions are presented (see appendix), makes is quite
obvious that several basic questions can hardly be answered in a measurable way
without essential terms having being clearly defined beforehand or in the
course of the interview. Enquiring after Heinz's / a judge's / a doctor's 'duties',
'obligations' or 'responsibilities' and the 'moral' rightness /
wrongness of their actions would presuppose a lengthy discussion of what
exactly the interviewer means and/or the subject understands in each individual
case. (In connection with Dilemma III, III! and IV, respectively)
In other instances, the answer is often at least partly implied by the way the
question is put. In these cases, the candidate can either guess at what the
researcher wants to hear, or s/he is subconsciously put on a track of reasoning
which might not be her/his own at all. Thus, Question 8 in Dilemma III reads: It
is against the law to steal. Does that make it morally wrong? The unspoken
'but' linking these two sentences, which makes the questioner's intention
unmistakably clear, more or less puts the 'logical' answer into the
respondent's mouth. Or Question 9: In general, should people try to do
everything they can to obey the law? Here, the words 'in general' and 'try
to' hardly leave the candidate any choice other than to come up with "Yes,
of course, but ..." and then go on to argue as desired.
By the same token, some questions are worded in a way that candidates of
average intelligence are very likely to sense the trap that has been laid for
them, and consequently they will try to reason their way around it. Question 4
of Dilemma III and Question 2 of Dilemma III! are of such a nature: If Heinz
doesn't love his wife, should he steal the drug for her? Or: Suppose
Officer Brown were a close friend of Heinz, should he then report him? Clearly,
the subject's attention is drawn to the fact that at a higher level of morality
such personal considerations have lost their raison d'être, and s/he is more
likely to reason as hypothecized.
Such criticism is countered by Turiel, who defends Kohlberg's (and his own)
clinical-interview method by stressing the importance of adequate probes to
clarifiy or disambiguate questions. But this in turn raises the question of the
generalizibility of results obtained by different interviewers who - in line
with their knowledge of the "specific hypotheses and aims of the
particular interview" (Turiel, 1983: 25) - might probe to varying degrees,
thus changing testing conditions, and hence results, considerably. And what may
be tested in the end, might turn out to be the 'zone of proximal development'
(Morss, 1996: 13), i.e. a person's achievement potential in correlation to
guidance, rather than his actual stage-related performance. Moreover, while
this type of testing may well require the "investigator's methodologies"
to be "related to hypotheses and theoretical propositions" (Turiel,
1983: 23), and thus explain the tendency to imply answers, Kohlberg did not
choose theoretical validity, but an empirical criterion, viz. the correlation
of his scale with chronolgical age. Given that he also explicitly ruled out the
inclusion of data disproving his theory of invariant stage sequences (in Lind,
1997: 5), these highly arbitrary factors can easily blur the line between
subjective and objective findings.
Additionally, in some cases Kohlberg attempts to solicit moral reasoning by
trying to get the subject to empathize with his 'characters'. And while Piaget
allows for the "interdependence" of cognitions as structure-building
entities and emotions as providing "the dynamics and energy" in that
process, he also postulates an end-state in which "feelings for other
people are overlaid by feelings for collective ideals" (Sternberg, 1992:
201). So it is questionable if the highest level of reasoning can be elicited
by, eg. describing Heinz as 'desperate' (Dilemma III), speaking of 'pet
animals' (and not crocodiles, for that matter; Dilemma III Question) or
using the euphemistic term 'mercy-killing' (Dilemma IV).
Moreover, some questions are rather complicated in that they present
multi-layered hypotheses. Accordingly, a respondent who is not well-versed in
such question-answer techniques may get stuck after the second stratum, not
being able to juggle the many reverse aspects of the underlying assumptions,
which would have to be contemplated before any answer could be given. Consider
Question 4 of Dilemma III: If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal
the drug for her? (Does it make a difference in what Heinz should do whether or
not he loves his wife?) Or Question 10 of Dilemma III!: Is there really
some correct solution to problems like Heinz's, or when people disagree, is
everybody's opinion equally right? Why? Linking two sentences that have two
or three different foci, makes it difficult to produce a coherent and exhaustive
answer. Leading us on to the more serious charges against Kohlberg's theory,
though, is Question 6 of Dilemma V: What's so important about human life
that makes it important to save or protect? Although not difficult to
understand as such, this question has certainly been at the heart of most
philosophical discussion over the centuries, and accordingly, the respondent is
expected to come up with an answer worthy of any of the great philosophers, no
less.
Especially this last point constitutes part of one the major charges that have
been levelled at Kohlberg, viz. that his work is strongly biased toward a
Western-style educated and technically advanced society. In line with Piaget,
Kohlberg does not see the process of (moral) development as one of maturation
nor as the result of socialization; instead he views it as the product of
mental processes stimulated by "open and democratic" interaction and
through "role-taking opportunities". (Crain, 1992: 142). And it is
only an educational system based on these principles that will foster formal
operational thinking of the kind required to be able to argue along
increasingly abstract and hypothetical lines.
However, his claim that "genuine moral understanding" is inextricably
linked to the "development of rational reasoning", which is at the
basis of his postulations, has been contested and empirically refuted.
Respective studies have shown varying scores on "Piagetian logical
tasks" and "Kohlberg's moral dilemma interview" (Stigler, 1990:
140). Explanations of the invalidity of the domain-general universalism of
constructivism might include the potential importance of modelling in moral
development, as formulated in Bandura's social learning theory, and would thus
entail a closer look at an entirely different developmental approach,
challenging cognitive developmental theory in general.
On the basis of afore-mentioned assumptions, however, Kohlberg has called for
teaching to centre round Socratic dialogue, since dialectic instruction will
bring about the representational intelligence which allows perspective-taking
and reflection on alternative courses of action. For according to
"dialectical theory", "change occurs when our ideas meet with
counterevidence that motivates us to formulate new and better ideas" (Crain,
1992: 123).
And although Kohlberg's insistence on educators' reasoning to be slightly
higher than their students' present developmental level, comes close to
Vygotsky's own claims arising from his theory of the 'zone of proximal
development', the Russian psychologist contests the claim of a universal stage
sequence on the grounds that children "will not develop purely abstract
modes of thought without instruction in abstract sign systems" (hence
'representational intelligence'), which "is only widespread in technically
advanced societies" (Crain, 1992: 199).
Furthermore, even having been schooled in such a way may not be a guarantee for
scoring high in Kohlberg's testing, for the capacity for abstract thinking does
not necessarily entail the willingness to reflect on one's knowledge, nor the
verbal skills required to give expression to such thoughts. And precisely this
potential discrepancy between knowledge and reasoning has been cited by critics
challenging the claim that his theory is culturally universal. After all, while
not all cultures may put the same emphasis on verbal exchanges and on
reflection and self-reflection, this is no justification for rating their
members morally inferior. For external circumstances might limit a society's
educational endeavours to teaching the three R's, or prevailing
philosophies/ideologies might set greater store by students' memorizing by
heart than by fostering independent thought.
Hence, Kohlberg has been charged with drawing (too) heavily on the ideas of
"Western philosophical tradition" (Crain, 1992: 152) and Western
liberal democracies "in defining the final, most adequate level of moral
judgment" (Helwig, 1997: 3). After all, in these an individual's rights
and the pursuit of liberty are stressed rather than a person's obligations or
duties within a community. Accordingly, people brought up in a duty-oriented
society might reason on the basis of a different moral code than the one
assumed by Kohlberg, for they may not have been raised in a way that would
enable them to "formulate conceptions of rights, values and principles by
which they evaluate existing social arrangements" (Crain, 1992: 151/152).
And this very notion of evaluating (and possibly finding fault with) existing
social arrangements might not be considered a worthy goal in societies
interested in the conservation of the status quo through obedience or respect.
Correspondingly, one recent cross-cultural study comparing North American and
Indian cultures, with the latter emphasizing "interpersonal relations and
community influences" (Mulder, 1997: 3), found evidence for at least a
partial influence of cultural systems on moral development. Contrary to
Piaget's and Kohlberg's isolated subjects that are "positioned outside
history and society" (Burman 1994: 154), individuals in Indian society
"are seen as a fundamental part of the social structure and thus the need
of others is viewed more often on moral terms" (Mulder, 1997: 3).
Accounting for such phenomena, however, would mean that Kohlberg's strict
separation of ratio and emotion could not be upheld. In the above care-based
system, attachment would have to be seen as a major factor influencing moral
reasoning. To be true, Kohlberg's theory is based on the assumption that,
contrary to Piaget's claim of a single-step procession from moral autonomy to
heteronomy, a person's moral development closely mirrors her/his
"gradually widening social radius", in which changing power
structures between individuals engaged in social interactions are seen as a
major influence. (in Sternberg, 1992: 212). Yet he does not view attachements
as a corollary of social interaction, and thus his hypothetical society is made
up of rather hypothetical individuals who have been stripped of any emotional
ties, so that he can define justice in terms of every person's claims being
treated as equal. In reality, though, a "special rights zone" is most
likely to be claimed by each person, in which the demands made on him will take
precedence over those made by any other member of that society. (in Stigler,
1990: 149) Moreover, it is in this context that Kohlberg's overall notion of
morality might be considered too restricted in that concepts such as
"guilt and shame" (Burman, 1994: 180) are not accomodated.
However, much of the above criticism is based on speculation and has not been
sufficiently supported by empirical data. On the contrary, an exhaustive review
of a large number of cross-cultural studies has produced reliable evidence
supporting the universality theory of the stage sequence; and "stage 5,
the ostensibly culturally biased Western moral perspective" (Helwig, 1997:
4) has also been found in non-Western societies. This may be due to the
critics' equating a particular culture's ideals with a comparable mode of
thought underlying its members' reasoning, when in reality their cognitive
structures are a limiting factor in their process of decoding the moral codes
prevailing in a certain culture. The fact that "almost all adults in all
cultures conceive of virtue as conformity with the subjective preferences of
the group" rather than the "objective obligations" (Stigler,
1990: 142) may also serve to explain the discrepancy that has been found in
North American-style democracies between the prevalent mode of moral reasoning
and its hypothetical ideal. "Indeed, the moral perspective found to be
normative (...) is not the individual rights and social contract perspective of
Stage 5, but rather the very different Stage 4 law and order morality"
(Helwig, 1997: 4).
Kohlberg himself insisted on the cross-cultural invariance of his stage
sequence on grounds that his "theory is not concerned with specific
beliefs but with underlying cognitive capabilities" (Crain, 1992: 122).
Accordingly, he stressed the importance of separating form and content in his
clinical interviews, a fact which has also been criticized for being based on
too restricted a notion of morality that fails to account for moral behaviour.
On the one hand, this stands in some contrast to the examples he chose as representative
of Stage 6 thinkers, Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. After all, these
two men actually lived according to their gospel, and in choosing them,
Kohlberg may have involuntarily applied a more commonsensical notion of
morality as composed of thinking, feeling and acting. The only hypothesis he
ventured as to a potential correlation was to assume that "moral behaviour
is more consistent, predictable, and responsible at the higher stages"
(Crain, 1992: 148). Given the inconclusive evidence of research in this field
and strictly applying his reasoning-only approach, however, it should not be
too difficult to find some Stage 5 or 6 thinkers among former as well as
present-day ideologues who might be hard to contest even when justifying
oppressive regimes by claiming some higher goal.
On the other hand, this splitting of "action from account" (Burman,
1994: 155) is difficult to reconcile with Kohlberg's emphasis on the importance
of environmental stimuli for development. In the first place, eliciting, and
responding to, such stimuli would require "attachments" "because
they herald the beginnings of interpersonal contexts from within which the
child will develop his or her interactions with the broader world"
(Durkin, 1995: 100). Additionally, "such constructive activities must take
place in specific contexts" (Sternberg, 1992: 110), and the knowledge thus
arrived at is most likely to reflect these context and culture-bound stimuli.
This may explain why some societies tested did not progress beyond Stage 3 in
their moral reasoning, as their members' thinking might not have been
sufficiently encouraged. Not taking these differences into account and not
allowing for different moral codes, means that non-Western reasoning is more
likely to be classified as "rationally inadequate" (Stigler, 1990:
142). And it is in this vein that Burman charges Kohlberg with denying and
perpetuating "the inequality of [children's] starting position", thus
devaluing "indigenous cultures and values" (Burman, 1994: 170).
More important still, severing thought from action makes one fundamental tenet
of cognitive development theories hard to hold, viz. that action as a catalyst
for the construction of cognitive structures will precede a person's reasoning
ability. (in Sternberg, 1992: 113) When solely concentrating on the discussion
of hypothetical dilemmas, however, "non-cognitive aspects and judgments of
experiences in the moral domain are ignored" and "the importance of
experiencing moral conflict, which would give rise to the cognitive structures
required for moral reasoning, is neglected" (Batisweiler, 1997: 5; my
translation).
Part of this charge has been incorporated in Carol Gilligan's criticism of
Kohlberg when she evaluated women's moral reasoning in connection with some
real-life issues such as abortion. Claiming that in his testing Kohlberg did
not account for the alleged difference in male and female moral orientations,
she attempted to show that through inherent gender differences and due to
context-based processes of socialization, women argue from a care-based moral
system as opposed to the rights-based system towards which Kohlberg's research
was inclined. Hence, Gilligan charged him with downgrading female moral
reasoning: "Regarding all constructions of responsibility as evidence of a
conventional moral understanding, Kohlberg defines the highest stages of moral
development as deriving from a reflective understanding of human rights"
(Gilligan, 1981: 19). However, studies aimed at substantiating her claims have
produced inconclusive evidence at best, while her work has come under some
attack for distortions of Kohlberg's theory and alleged misinterpretations of
her own findings. (in Helwig, 1997: 5)
One of her criticisms, however, the context dependence of moral reasoning, has
been taken up by several researchers challenging cognitivist theories of a
"structure-of-the-whole", which should result in a high level of
consistency in a person's reasoning across content domains and situational
contexts. (in Sternberg, 1992: 119). Their findings have, on the whole, shown a
high degree of variability instead. (For cross-domain validity, see page 3). As
to contextual factors, it was found, for example, that a person may reason in
line with Stage 3 thinking on property questions while representing Stage 4 on
human rights issues. Additionally, slightly modifying Kohlberg's dilemmas (e.g.
Heinz facing more severe punishment) or testing conditions (e.g. more
prompting) has produced noticeably different results. (in Helwig, 1997: 6) One
study has even found that a situational factor, such as a positive mood
generated prior to an interview, might elicit a higher level of moral judgment
from a subject since a good mood allegedly encourages formal operational
thinking, one major prerequisite for principled moral reasoning. (in
Batisweiler, 1997: 4)
Outlining some major criticism of Kohlberg's theory, i.e. that "moral
development may be much more context and concept specific" than his global
stage theory (Helwig, 1997: 7), and that "how we feel, act and think about
good and bad" should all be considered as "parts of our
morality" (Crosser, 1996: 1), does not mean to belittle his lasting
influence e.g. on educational systems. After all, Kohlberg's call for a learning
environment geared to fostering development by stimulating students' cognitive
capacities and hence their moral reasoning abilities, has certainly been heard
in classrooms far and wide. Accordingly, formal instruction has had to make
some room for a child-centred approach providing opportunities for role play,
peer interaction as well as experiences and discussion of moral conflict. And
while Kohlberg's grounding in Piaget's constructivism may entail a rather
normative view of development by prescribing an "endpoint, the goal, of
development", the former's advocacy of facilitating reasoning centering
round justice, rights and welfare, can hardly be construed as serving
"bourgeois" ideologies in "maintaining social control within and
between social groups and nations" (Burman, 1994: 183 and 19). For
although he postulates "rational universal principles" (Sternberg,
1992: 214) as the ultimate guideline for of a person's moral judgment, adult
interaction with children is meant to pave the way for their intellectual
emancipation from any pressure to conform to authority so that the ideas they
will be able to formulate will be their own. (in Crain, 1992: 142)
Dilemma III: In Europe, a
woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the
doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the
same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the
druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400
for the radium and charged $4,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick
woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried
every legal means, but he could only get together about $2,000, which is half of
what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to
sell it cheaper or let him pay later, But the druggist said, "No, I
discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So, having tried
every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man's
store to steal the drug for his wife.
Dilemma III!: Heinz did break into the store. He stole the drug and gave it to
his wife. In the newspapers the next day there was an account of the robbery.
Mr. Brown, a police officer who knew Heinz, read the account. He remembered
seeing Heinz running away from the store and realized that it was Heinz who
stole the drug. Mr. Brown wonders whether he should report that it was Heinz
who stole the drug.
Continuation: Officer Brown did report Heinz. Heinz was arrested and brought to
court. A jury was selected. The jury's job is to find whether a person is
innocent or guilty of committing a crime. The jury finds Heinz guilty. It is up
to the judge to determine the sentence.
Dilemma IV: There was a woman who had very bad cancer, and there was no
treatment known to medicine that would save her. Her doctor, Dr. Jefferson,
knew that she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but
she was so weak that a good dose of a painkiller like morphine would make her
die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, but in her calm
periods she would ask Dr. Jefferson to give her enough morphine to kill her.
She said she couldn't stand the pain and she was going to die in a few months
anyway. Although he knows that mercy-killing is against the law, the doctor
thinks about granting her request.
Dilemma V: In Korea, a company of Marines was way outnumbered and was
retreating before the enemy. The company had crossed a bridge over a river, but
the enemy were mostly still on the other side. If someone went back to the
bridge and blew it up, with the head start the rest of the men in the company
would have, they could probably then escape. But the man who stayed back to
blow up the bridge would not be able to escape alive. The captain himself is
the man who knows best how to lead the retreat. He asks for volunteers, but no
one will volunteer. If he goes himself, the men will probably not get back
safely and he is the only one who knows how to lead the retreat.
© 1998, Iris Guske, c/o Berufsfachschule und Fachakademie für Fremdsprachenberufe, Rathausplatz 2, 87435 Kempten.